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Abstract: Widely influential Duverger’s “law” and “hypothesis” describe the main 
direction of influence of electoral rules on party systems, however, their formulations are 
quite blurry what makes their application to concrete electoral results often ambiguous. 
Therefore, this research conducted an original survey among electoral experts (n=131) to 
explore whether they apply Duverger’s rule in a consistent pattern which could lead to its 
less ambiguous specification. Experts’ responses revealed a considerable heterogeneity 
which indicates that they are often unsure about the likely outcomes of electoral systems. 
Nevertheless, experts were on average close to the central tendency predicted by the Seat 
Product Models (Taagepera, 2007) which quantifies the Duverger’s rule. Hence, experts 
on average think that election outcomes should look like what Seat Product Models predict. 
Therefore, the Models should be used as a baseline in electoral studies, because they allow 
more fine-grained evaluation of electoral systems. 




This article will be published in Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties (currently 




One of the most influential theoretical frameworks in the field of electoral studies is 
Duverger’s “law” and “hypothesis”. Generally, the Duverger’s proposition can be 
summarized as: the more permissive the system is, the higher the resulting fragmentation of 
the party system will be (Duverger, 1963). Duverger described the main direction of influence 
of electoral rules on the resulting fragmentation of party systems, however, at its core, this 
widely applied expectation remained quite blurry. The only precisely defined element is that 
the seat allocation by plurality in single-seat districts should tend to produce two-party 
constellations. Yet, what kind of constellation is still acceptable as a result of restrictive 
systems, or how fragmented the outcome is expected to be in various kinds of more 
permissive systems remained unspecified. 
Therefore, this research note examines the Duverger’s rule and its application by 
experts on electoral systems to find out whether there is a general trend in the experts’ 
assessments that could help to specify the expectations based on the Duverger’s rule in a less 
ambiguous manner. This paper analyses responses of 131 experts in an originally conducted 
expert survey. Experts were requested to evaluate six cases of electoral results produced by 
simple systems and decide whether they could be considered as a typical outcome of given set 
of electoral rules. 
This note discovers two relevant conclusions: First, experts’ responses revealed a 
considerable heterogeneity. That indicates that, in many cases, experts remain uncertain about 
what the likely outcome of electoral systems should be. Second, despite heterogeneity among 
experts, their evaluation of electoral outcomes is close to what the Seat Product Models 
(Taagepera, 2007) predict to be the baseline central tendency for outcomes generated by given 
set of electoral rules. 
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These findings point to the fact that even though electoral experts are undoubtedly 
well trained to see whether electoral results are surprising with respect to given electoral rules, 
there is no widely-accepted measure which would clarify Duverger’s rule when it is 
confronted with empirical data. Nevertheless, this study suggests that experts have been dimly 
aware of the central tendency being close to what the Seat Product Models equations predict 
even before they were spelled out. Since the Models are expressed as mathematical formulas, 
they allow to formulate clear expectations about the baseline central tendency in the effects of 
electoral systems: to what degree can already a minor change in the number of seats 
appointed via an electoral system influence the number and size of political parties. Thus, 
they constitute a useful tool for increasing accuracy in electoral studies. 
Duverger and expectations about electoral outcomes 
In the field of electoral studies, the general expectation about the performance of electoral 
systems is most often derived from the “law” and “hypothesis” formulated by Duverger 
(1963) more than half a century ago. Duverger's law proposes that “the simple majority 
single-ballot system favors the two-party system” and this relationship holds so tightly in 
empirical reality that it led Duverger to conclude that “this approaches most nearly perhaps to 
a true sociological law” (Duverger, 1963: 217). Duverger’s hypothesis assumes that “the 
simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favors multi-
partyism” (Duverger, 1963: 239). 
These two propositions became a foundation of the “Duvergerian agenda” (Shugart, 
2005) in electoral research which generally expects that more restrictive systems (with FPTP 
being the purest form thanks to its SMDs) allow fewer parties to enter the assembly. On the 
contrary, their permissive counterparts (i.e., proportional systems with high district 
magnitude) result in a more heterogeneous and fragmented body (Rae, 1995). 
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Even though Duverger captured the main direction of influence of electoral rules on 
the resulting fragmentation of party systems, the formulation of his widely applied law and 
hypothesis have remained quite vaguely specified until today. Indeed, it is clearly stated that 
the FPTP should lead to a two-party system, however, what constellation is still acceptable as 
a result of restrictive systems, or how fragmented outcomes should result from permissive 
systems remain a question. 
Nevertheless, Duverger’s framework became one of the most influential theoretical 
frameworks in the field of electoral studies (Shugart, 2005). It allows scholars to make 
reasonable assumptions about the effect of electoral rules on the number and sizes of parties 
getting representation in a system. 
Benefits of unambiguous theoretical frameworks 
Formulation of the Duverger’s rule is in contrast with theories in other scientific disciplines 
such as physics, chemistry, or even economics (Colomer, 2007). Those apply less ambiguous 
specifications of theoretical concepts, ideally expressed as mathematical relationships, which 
capture approximate baseline tendencies typical for relationships among them. Similar 
practice can carry certain benefits also for political science.  
First, the role of theories is to provide experts with sufficient expertise and accuracy 
so their evaluation of a similar problem can reach consistent conclusions (Weiss and 
Shanteau, 2004). If that is not the case, Cassidy and Buede (2009: 457–458) argue that “a 
principal reason for poor judgment is faulty beliefs, which are in turn related to a lack of 
adequate feedback, and an absence of robust, verified, and consistent theories”. This aspect 
may not be fully apparent in political science, yet, one can hardly imagine that competing 
opinions among experts would be generally desired in medicine when two physicians evaluate 
the medical condition of a patient. Therefore, theoretical frameworks should provide a useful 
guidance for expectations about the studied effects. 
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Second, more accurate specification of the theoretical frameworks allows to overcome 
directional approach which currently dominates the political science. Directional approach 
describes general tendencies, however, it does not allow to evaluate the relationships between 
concepts in a more fine-grained manner (Taagepera, 2018). For example, Duverger’s rule 
allows to expect that a switch from FPTP to proportional system will likely increase the 
number of parties in a system, however, it does not provide much assistance to estimate at 
least a general tendency to what degree fragmentation increases if a proportional system 
increases the size of its districts. 
Due to these reasons, political science should seek to capture the baseline central 
tendencies among studied concepts in a less ambiguous manner, despite complexity of social 
reality and abundance of factors influencing human behaviour. 
Quantification of Duverger’s rule 
Relevant work in “quantification of Duverger’s rule” has been done by Taagepera (2007). 
Even though Taagepera has successfully tested his below-discussed models against empirical 
data, the consistency of his work with perception of electoral experts has remained a question. 
This research aims to bridge these two aspects together. 
Taagepera’s (2007) core contribution is the Seat Product, which consists of only two 
institutional variables – country's average district magnitude (𝑀) and its assembly size (𝑆). 
Based on these two numbers, Taagepera develops quantitative logical models capable of 
estimating surprisingly accurate central tendencies for outcomes of electoral systems. 
Taagepera’s models are expressed as mathematical formulas, therefore, their result is an exact 
numerical prediction which represents the expected outcome for given electoral system (Li 
and Shugart, 2016: 26). It has to be emphasized that logical models do not claim to have the 
ability to perfectly estimate electoral outcomes. They just utilize the institutional constrains 
(i.e., number of available seats) and generate a prediction which serves as a benchmark or an 
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expected central tendency for given institutional arrangements (Shugart and Taagepera, 2017: 
113–114; Taagepera, 2018: 5). 
Both Duverger and Taagepera begin at the institutional constrains of electoral rules 
and study their influence over the number and size of parties in a system. This conceptual 
overlap makes Taagepera’s quantitative logical models a suitable theoretical quantification of 
the Duverger’s rule and allows to compare the experts’ application of the Duverger’s logic 
against benchmarks predicted by the Models.  
This paper utilizes two quantitative logical models developed by Taagepera (2007: 
115–164) which describe the impact of electoral systems on two relevant attributes of party 
systems: largest part seat share, and effective number of parties. These two concepts suitably 
capture the format of a party system which constitutes the dependent variable in the 
Duverger’s framework. 
The first quantitative logical model predicts seat share of the largest party in an 
assembly (s1̂). Even though Duverger’s framework does not deal specifically with this 
attribute, size of the largest party has relevant implications for structure of a party system and 
its internal dynamics. This certainly falls under the focus of Duverger’s theory. If the largest 
party is expected to gain more than 50 per cent of seats, such information reveals that the 
largest party can form the government (if the system is parliamentary) and thus become the 
dominant force in the future political development. Even when the value is lower than 0.5 
(i.e., 50%), s1̂ still gives a useful hint about the expected weight of the largest party in a 
system or how big could be the other parties.  
The logical model specifies that the predicted largest party seat share (s1̂) is equal to 









From this equation, Taagepera (2007: 152–156) takes another step and deduces a 
logical model estimating the effective number of parties with legislative representation (Nŝ).
1 
The effective number of parties is a widely used indicator capturing the fragmentation of 
party systems. In fact, Duverger’s law and hypothesis refer directly to this attribute when they 
predict that a specific electoral system will result in a “two-party system” or “multi-partyism” 
(Duverger, 1963: 217, 239). 
The model estimating Nŝ is equal to the sixth root of Seat Product: 
 
Nŝ = (𝑀𝑆)
1 6⁄  (Taagepera, 2007: 152) 
 
Due to the space constrains, this paper cannot discuss the comprehensive theoretical 
background for both models, however, it is provided in Taagepera’s Predicting Party Sizes 
(2007: 115–164).2 Empirical testing revealed that quantitative logical models deliver 
remarkably good estimates of central tendencies: The statistical best fit lines are almost 
superimposed with the prediction lines for s1̂ and Nŝ (Taagepera, 2007: 126, 153). Shugart 
and Taagepera (2017: 101–102) conducted additional empirical testing with extended dataset 
and found out that almost all electoral outcomes in hundreds of democratic elections 
worldwide remain within a factor of two3 from the predicted values of s1̂ and Nŝ. Even though 
this implies quite a bit of variation, the Seat Product Models provide an accurate benchmark 
of the underlying central tendency for the effects of electoral systems. 
 
1. Nŝ represents the effective number of parliamentary/seat-winning parties. For the formula see 
Laakso and Taagepera (1979). 
2. Taagepera’s logic is also effectively summarized by Li and Shugart (2016: 26–27) or Shugart and 
Taagepera (2018). 
3. Factor of two means that the predicted value is multiplied or divided by two. 
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Taagepera (2007: 23–46) originally warned that the Seat Product Models work 
satisfactorily only for simple electoral systems which allocate all seats in districts with 
average district magnitude 𝑀. In more complex systems, legal thresholds and adjustments 
outside the basic electoral districts blur the impact of 𝑀 and, therefore, additional parameters 
or other considerations are necessary. For two-tier systems, Li and Shugart (2016) and 
Shugart and Taagepera (2017: 285–307) presented a solution which accounts for the seats 
distributed via upper tier and hence improves predictions of the central tendencies based on 
the Seat Product Model. 
Data and methods 
The main goal of this work is to explore how experts on electoral systems utilize the 
Duverger’s framework. As a benchmark, the research utilizes Taagepera’s Seat Product 
Models and asks experts to evaluate the electoral outcomes in six cases that were intentionally 
selected for their large deviation from the prediction generated by the Seat Product Models. 
All cases represent simple electoral systems, as defined by Taagepera (2007: 23–46). 
Selection of deviating cases allows to keep the survey short and not too time-consuming for 
participating experts, while still being able to examine whether experts’ evaluation is 
consistent with the quantitative logical models. Table 1 presents the list of included elections 
together with their expected and real values of effective number of parties and largest party 
seat shares. Additionally, it shows that the cases include various sizes of average district 








Table 1. Selection of cases for expert survey 
 Assembly size (𝑺) 
Average district 
magnitude (𝑴) 
Effective number of 
parties (𝐍𝐬) 
Expected effective 
number of parties 
(𝐍?̂?) 
Largest party seat 
share (𝐬𝟏) 
Expected largest 
party seat share 
(𝐬?̂?) 
Case 1: Luxembourg 1999 60 15 4.34 3.11 31.7% 42.7% 
Case 2: Canada 2006 308 1 3.20 2.60 40.3% 48.9% 
Case 3: Netherlands 2017 150 150 8.12 5.31 22.0% 28.6% 
Case 4: Portugal 1991 230 10.45 2.23 3.66 58.7% 37.8% 
Case 5: United Kingdom 1959 630 1 1.99 2.93 57.9% 44.7% 
Case 6: Slovakia 2012 150 150 2.88 5.31 55.3% 28.6% 
Note: See Online appendix A for additional information on selected cases and Online appendix B for the questionnaire. 
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The cases were anonymized, meaning that experts were presented only with necessary 
institutional variables, i.e., assembly size, number of districts and information on whether the 
system is majoritarian or proportional, and results for Party A, B, C, etc. used instead of real 
party labels.4 Participating experts were not informed that the presented electoral results are 
real. In fact, experts were provided with the same amount of information as is required by 
logical models to deliver a prediction of baseline central tendency. 
In sum, 844 experts were approached whose (co-)authored contribution appeared in at 
least one of the two main journals dedicated to electoral research – i.e., Electoral Studies and 
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties (JEPOP) – between January 2012 and 
October 2017.5 Selection of authors who were successful in convincing the reviewers and 
editors to pass their research articles through peer-review in the flagship journals allows this 
study to eliminate subjective bias which would be inevitable if the list of experts would be 
compiled by the survey administrator. Additionally, this selection method ensures that (a) the 
survey reached those scholars who are actively involved in the topic and (b) their work 
actively influence the development of the field.6 Data collection took place between October 
16 and November 5, 2017, during which time the questionnaire was fully completed by 131 
experts what is a number comparable to other survey among experts on electoral systems (see 
Bowler et al., 2005). Another 173 experts started to fill in the survey but gave up. Thirty-five 
 
4. See Online appendix B for questionnaire. 
5. All authors whose e-mail address was published on the journals’ webpages were invited. In the case 
of Electoral Studies, authors of Election Notes were not approached. 
6. It could be argued that this selection of survey respondents lumps together specialists on electoral 
systems and scholars more broadly focused on electoral behaviour. However, also broadly 
focused scholars publishing in Electoral Studies and JEPOP must consider permissiveness and 
(dis)proportionality of electoral systems – concepts built directly on Duverger’s work. Therefore, 
their opinion is still a qualified assessment and provides relevant information on how experts in 
the field evaluate electoral systems and their outcomes. 
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experts refused to participate and twenty-five were impossible to reach, despite a manual 
search for their new contact information. 
For each of the six anonymized cases of election results, experts were asked two main 
questions: (Q1) for their opinion about fragmentation: “Imagine the most typical outcome of 
the [described system]. If you compare it with the displayed results, would you say that the 
resulting number of represented parties seem to be:” and (Q2) for their opinion about the 
largest party share: “Imagine the most typical outcome of the [described system]. If you 
compare it with the displayed results, would you say that the largest party seem to be:”. Both 
questions offered the same set of answers, which were recoded into numerical values as 
follows (a) Too large = 1; (b) As expected = 0; (c) Too small = -1; (d) Hard to say = N/A. 
Every question offered experts an optional space to explain the reason(s) for given 
assessment. 
Measures 
The answers provided by experts are compared to the prediction of the central tendency for 
largest party seat share (s1̂) and effective number of parties (Nŝ). However, the experts were 
approached with a question whether they can spot a deviation from their idea of “the most 
typical outcome”, while s1̂ and Nŝ formulate a prediction which could be considered as “the 
most typical outcome”. Hence, to achieve consistency, I need to construct a measure which 
would quantify the deviation of electoral outcomes in a given case from theoretical 
expectations based on s1̂ and Nŝ. 
The biggest challenge for the measure is the fact that fragmentation of a party system 
as well as the share of a largest party can vary greatly. Therefore, one cannot apply basic 
subtraction to find out the absolute difference between expectation and outcome, because it 
does not take into account the qualitative difference between party system consisting of few 
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and of many parties. For example, if an expectation is off by one party in case of a five-party 
system, it is still a decent estimation because it stays on the grounds of a multiparty 
constellation. However, in case of a two-party system being off by one party constitutes a 
much bigger failure, because it means that we are not talking about bipartisan system 
anymore.7 Therefore, instead of absolute differences (i.e., subtraction), which are unable to 
take variance in size into account, the indices employ relative differences reached through 
division. 
In the indices 𝑑𝑁𝑠 and 𝑑𝑠1 presented below, real electoral outcome (i.e., effective 
number of parties or largest party seat share) is divided by the theoretical prediction based on 
one of the logical models (i.e., (𝑀𝑆)1 6⁄  or (𝑀𝑆)−1 8⁄ , respectively). The result represents the 
relative difference between a real electoral outcome compared to the expected central 
tendency. Additionally, a logarithm is applied on the result of the division. The reason is that 
it has been proven on numerous places (Taagepera, 2007: 115–164; Shugart and Taagepera, 
2017: 101–108; Taagepera and Shugart, 1993) that the Seat Product (i.e., 𝑀𝑆) reveals a linear 
pattern only on a logarithmic scale. The purpose of the logarithm is to straighten the trend of 
𝑑𝑁𝑠 and 𝑑𝑠1 into a linear form which is more intuitive and thus more consistent with experts’ 
brief considerations while filling in the survey. The final formulas are as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑠1 = log[𝑠1 (𝑀𝑆)
−1 8⁄⁄ ] 
𝑑𝑁𝑠 = log[𝑁𝑠 (𝑀𝑆)
1 6⁄⁄ ] 
 
In theory, due to the implementation of the logarithm, the possible values of 𝑑𝑁𝑠 and 
𝑑𝑠1 can range from minus infinity to infinity. However, there are three arbitrary values which 
 
7. Based on the widely accepted conceptual categories of party systems, I assume that experts evaluate 
resulting fragmentation in the similar fashion. 
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can help grasp the meaning of a result. The first one is zero. If real and predicted values are 
equal, the result of their division is one. That, after the logarithm is applied, gives zero. 
Therefore, when 𝑑𝑁𝑠 or 𝑑𝑠1 is equal to zero, the empirical outcome perfectly meets the 
expectation about baseline central tendency for given electoral system. 
The second and third arbitrary chosen values of 𝑑𝑁𝑠 and 𝑑𝑠1 are -0.3 and 0.3. The 
value -0.3 signals that the actual outcome is half of the expected. On the contrary, if the 
empirical outcome is twice the expected, the value of the index is 0.3. If a value falls within 
the interval [-0.3, 0.3], the real electoral outcome stays within a factor of two from 
prediction.8 These values are set with respect to the empirical testing conducted by Taagepera 
(2007: 123, 153) and Shugart and Taagepera (2017: 101–102) which revealed that most cases 
included in the datasets fall within this interval. 
Analysis: How experts evaluate outcomes of electoral systems 
In the survey, experts on electoral systems were requested to assess whether six presented 
election outcomes follow or deviate from the expected central tendency for described 
electoral rules. The descriptive statistics based on experts’ responses are displayed in Table 2. 
In all cases, the standard deviation is close to 0.5. If we consider that experts were offered 
three options -1, 0, and 1, standard deviations of 0.5 suggest that evaluations done by experts 
are quite heterogeneous. Figure 1 visualizing the frequency of answers supports this 
conclusion. In most cases, three out of four provided answers (if we include the option “Hard 
to say”) are chosen by a substantial number of respondents. Moreover, experts frequently opt 
for the “Hard to say”; even in the least ambiguous case (i.e., Case 5: United Kingdom 1959) 
every fifth expert chose this option. Such a large degree of heterogeneity can be explained by 
 
8. Staying within a factor of two means that the result is within the interval bounded by numbers if the 
predicted value is multiplied or divided by two. 
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the fact that political science does not have widely accepted standards that would unify 
expectations about outcomes of various electoral systems. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of answers in the expert survey 
  
N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Largest party  
seat share 
Case 1: Luxembourg 1999 93 -0.075 0.472 -1 1 
Case 2: Canada 2006 100 -0.700 0.560 -1 1 
Case 3: Netherlands 2017 103 -0.184 0.500 -1 1 
Case 4: Portugal 1991 99 0.465 0.644 -1 1 
Case 5: United Kingdom 1959 104 -0.019 0.482 -1 1 




Case 1: Luxembourg 1999 99 0.101 0.580 -1 1 
Case 2: Canada 2006 99 0.687 0.547 -1 1 
Case 3: Netherlands 2017 103 0.330 0.549 -1 1 
Case 4: Portugal 1991 94 -0.245 0.651 -1 1 
Case 5: United Kingdom 1959 105 -0.019 0.480 -1 1 
Case 6: Slovakia 2012 88 -0.330 0.519 -1 1 
 
 
This impression is additionally supported by the experts’ responses to the optional 
space included in the survey in which they could voluntarily explain their assessment. It was 
used at least once by 87 out of the 131 participating experts who finished the survey. 
Surprisingly, only three experts (2.3% of those who finished the survey) specifically 
mentioned a criterion they employed. Others (at least once) requested information about vote 
shares (35 respondents = 26.7% of those who finished the survey), additional features of 
electoral districts9 (25 respondents = 19.1% of those who finished the survey) or societal 
cleavages (6 respondents = 4.6% of those who finished the survey).  
 




Figure 1. The frequency of answers in the expert survey 
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Based on the recoded answers of experts, I computed an average expert opinion about 
party system fragmentation for particular cases and plotted them against the deviation index 
for largest party seat share 𝑑𝑠1 (see Figure 2). In the figures, the black line represents 
statistical best fit (based on results from Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3. Statistical fit: Average of experts vs. deviation 
 𝑑𝑠1  𝑑𝑁𝑠  
Average of experts: 
Largest party seat share 
0.318** (0.112)   
Average of experts: 
Effective number of parties 
  0.422* (0.159) 
Constant 0.042 (0.046) -0.075 (0.057) 
N 6 6 
R2 / Adj. R2 0.669 / 0.586 0.637 / 0.546 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05 
 
 
The average expert opinion is in a high level of agreement with deviation index 𝑑𝑠1. 
Despite having only six observations, the correlation is high (R2=0.669) and statistically 
significant at p<0.05 level. All cases lie close to the statistical best fit. In general, these results 
indicate that experts (on average) apply the Duverger’s rule in the fashion similar to the 
estimation of its central tendency by the Model s1̂ = (𝑀𝑆)
−1 8⁄ . 
However, Figure 2 reveals that while the three cases – Canada 2006, Netherlands 
2017, and Luxembourg 1999 – deviate from the Seat Product Model to a comparable degree, 
the experts tend to see the differences among them as bigger. In the case of the 2006 Canadian 
elections, the experts tend to conclude that the seat share of 40.3% assigned to the largest 
party is too low for a FPTP system. This follows the Duverger’s logic, which stipulates that 
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such a system should produce a competition of two parties and hence the seat share of each 
party should not be too far away from 50%. However, Duverger’s (1963: 239) “proportional 
representation favors multi-partyism” does not provide much assistance to evaluate the size of 
the largest party in the Netherlands 2017 and Luxembourg 1999. That may be the reason why 
more than half of the experts concluded that the largest party is “As expected” in both cases. 
This indicates that even though experts can distinguish the instances when the largest party is 
too large or too small, the Duverger’s rule is not clear enough to allow more fine-grained 
evaluation of electoral outcomes. Despite this aspect, the experts come fairly close to the 
baseline central tendency as predicted by the Seat Product Model. 
 




A very similar situation can be observed in the case of effective number of parties. 
The degree of agreement between the experts’ average opinion and 𝑑𝑁𝑠 is again high 
(R2=0.637) and despite limited number of observations, it is statistically significant at the 
p<0.1 level (see Table 3). In fact, the actual p-value is p=0.057 and therefore this result only 
narrowly fails to pass the conventional threshold p<0.05. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates 
that the experts’ evaluation of election outcomes comes close to the expected benchmark 
based on Seat Product Model Nŝ = (𝑀𝑆)
1 6⁄ . 
However, also in this case, the experts evaluate the resulting fragmentation (and its 
deviation from expected tendency) in Canada 2006, the Netherlands 2017, and Luxembourg 
1999 slightly different than the Seat Product Model. The distribution of seats in the Canadian 
2006 elections (i.e., 124–103–51–29–1) resulted in a party system constellation whose 
fragmentation was immediately rated by a majority of the experts as “Too large”. Indeed, the 
actual effective number of parties is 3.22, which makes Canada a poor representative of 
bipartisan system. Nevertheless, the experts chose “Too large” less frequently for the 
Netherlands 2017, where the effective number of parties climbs up to 8.12, and Luxembourg 
1999 with effective number of parties equal to 4.34 despite implementing relatively small 
districts (i.e., 15 seats) together with a small assembly size (i.e., 60 seats). This again suggests 
that Duverger’s framework provides a clear expectation for the FPTP, however, it is too 
vaguely formulated to provide a clear benchmark for proportional systems. Therefore, experts 





Figure 3. Experts vs. Deviation: Effective number of parties  
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
The Duverger’s proposition (1963) stands at the very core of electoral studies. Even though 
this rule became widely influential (Shugart, 2005), its formulation has remained quite blurry 
until today. Therefore, this research conducted a survey among experts on electoral system 
(n=131) to find out how they utilize Duverger’s framework. 
Experts’ responses revealed considerable heterogeneity and tendency to evaluate 
electoral outcomes “As expected”, if Duverger’s framework does not provide a clear 
expectation about the effect of electoral rules. Nevertheless, the survey confirmed that when 
experts on electoral systems apply the Duverger’s framework (1963), their assessment comes 
on average close to the baseline central tendency as estimated by the Seat Product Models 
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(Taagepera, 2007). Hence, this research concludes that experts on average think that election 
outcomes should look like benchmarks generated by the Seat Product Models, however, a 
non-negligible share of them remain uncertain about what the likely outcome should be. 
Therefore, the experts seem to agree with the Seat Product Models that institutional 
constraints – average district magnitude (𝑀) and assembly size (𝑆) – partially determine 
election outcomes, yet there is no wide consensus whether (and which) additional factors 
should be taken into account in order to increase precision of political science in estimating 
effects of electoral systems. Nevertheless, unambiguous numerical estimation of the baseline 
central tendency generated by the Seat Product Models could provide a valuable tool for 
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